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ABSTRAK 
Penelitian ini dimaksudkan untuk menunjukkan bahwa sistem pemilu 
Indonesia selalu mengalami dinamika yang pesat dalam pengembangan 
kebijakan. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian hukum normatif dan 
dikombinasikan dengan empiris. Penelitian normatif terfokus pada aturan dan 
acuan positif normatif. Sementara empiris, lebih fokus pada data lapangan 
yang diambilkan dari dinamika ide dan gagasan di lapangan. Pendekatan 
historis kemudian dikombinasikan untuk menajamkan analisa dan 
pembacaan masalah secara lebih kritis dan evaluatif. Khususnya di dalam 
perdebatan di Panitia Khusus untuk persiapan regulasi tentang Presidential 
Threshold. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa keputusan ambang batas 
presiden 20% dalam penyelenggaraan Pilpres 2019 mengandung substansi 
hukum ortodoks. Hal ini karena secara politik hukum pembentukannya (UU 
No. 7 Tahun 2017) sarat dengan kepentingan politik praktis partai yang 
berkuasa. Partai yang terdiri dari 6 fraksi memberikan opini dominan yang 
condong ke ambang batas 25%-30% yang disarankan pemerintah, sedangkan 
4 fraksi lainnya tidak setuju dengan ambang batas pencalonan yang tinggi, 
karena konsep pemilu harus memberikan ruang bebas bagi masing-masing 
partai untuk mencalonkan calon presidennya. Pemerintah memiliki agenda 
sendiri untuk melanjutkan dan memperpanjang presiden yang ada saat ini dan 
mencegah kemungkinan untuk orang lain. Oleh karena itu, untuk melindungi 
agenda, diusulkan ambang nominasi yang tinggi. Melalui analisis isi regulasi 
tersebut dapat dikatakan bahwa ambang batas yang tinggi memiliki 
konsekuensi logis dalam penyelenggaraan pemilu yang menciptakan 
lingkungan pemilu yang tidak substansial dan membuat iklim politik di 
Indonesia tidak seimbang.     
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Kata kunci: Hukum otoriter, hukum dan politik, substansi ortodoks, 
presidensial threshold 
ABSTRACT 
This study is intended to indicate that Indonesia's electoral system always 
experiences rapid dynamics in policy development. This study uses empirical 
normative legal research or a legal research method that uses a set of regulation 
relating to general elections and the rules of making positive law as reference of 
norms. Empirical research is also used to observe the results of human behavior in 
the form of physical archives. The methods are combined with the historical 
approach: an approach that is carried out by analyzing the debate arguments that 
occurred in the special committee meeting (Panitia Khusus) of the Election Draft 
Bill. The result of this research is the decision of the presidential threshold of 
20% in the holding of presidential elections of 2019 contains the orthodox legal 
substance. This is because politically the law of its formation (Law No. 7 of 2017) 
is full of practical political interests of the ruling parties. Parties consisting of 6 
factions gave a dominant opinion which leaned towards the 25% -30% threshold 
suggested by the government, while the other 4 factions do not agree with the 
high nomination threshold, because the concept of election must provide free 
space for each party to nominate their respective presidential candidates. The 
government had its own agenda to continue and extend the existing incumbent 
president and prevent the possibility for others. Therefore, in order to protect the 
agenda, high nomination threshold was proposed. Through content analyses of 
the regulation it can be stated that the high threshold has logical consequences 
for holding elections which create an insubstantial election environment and 
make the political climate in Indonesia unbalanced.  




General elections must be held periodically, this is due to several 
reasons, namely, first, people's opinions on election policies always change 
according to the demands of the time. This is because socio-cultural 
developments always demand changes in the latest circumstances. Second, 
some aspects affect internally and externally. Externally this is influenced by 
changes in the international world and internally is changed in political will 
and conditions within the country itself. Third, it is influenced by demographic 
factors or the increasing number of adult residents who already have 
constitutional political rights (Asshiddiqie, 2008). 
The implementation of the general election was originally intended to 
elect legislative members namely (DPR, DPD, and DPRD). After the 4th 
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amendment of the 1945 Constitution, there was a change to the institutional 
system that was originally the president appointed by the MPR to be a direct 
election system by the people. This direct democracy is called by Abraham 
Lincoln as "government of the people, by the people, and for the people" 
(Bastian, Luckham, & Goetz, 2003). It is the amendment that describes 
partially about democracy as well as a logical consequence of the democratic 
state itself (Oetama, 2001). 
The practice of holding presidential and vice-presidential elections 
which began in 2004 until 2014 is conducted periodically or in the time after 
the legislative elections. There may be a grace period created to make the 
results of legislative elections (parliamentary threshold) become a 
reference/ticket to nominate a presidential candidate with a predetermined 
threshold. 
Normatively, this can be seen in the provisions of Article 222 of Law 
Number 7 of 2017 concerning election which states that a candidate pair is 
proposed by a political party or a combination of political parties participating 
in the General Election that meets the requirement of obtaining seats in the 
DPR at least 20% or obtaining a valid national vote as much as 25% in 
legislative elections. With this periodic mechanism, it can guarantee a balanced 
supporting axis between incumbent and opposition, so that when the 
government runs, it will not be one of the more dominant institutions and 
negate the system of checks and balances (Wisnewski, 2014). 
In addition to the periodic elections to stabilize stable political 
conditions, a threshold mechanism for presidential nominations or 
presidential thresholds that has been used in the 2014 elections has also been 
created. However, it becomes a problem if the periodic elections become 
simultaneous and use high thresholds in presidential nominations. This will 
have an impact on the political intensity and the tug of war in the election will 
occur, even it will have an impact on the decline in the quality of democracy in 
the election. This provision can be seen in the decision of the Constitutional 
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Court Number 14 / PUU-XI / 2013, which decadently requires the legislative 
elections to be held simultaneously in conjunction with the presidential 
election. 
Hence, some problems come: first, the simultaneous holding of 
elections using the concept of the high presidential threshold will cause 
uncertainty. That is from which percentage of presidential threshold to 
nominate presidential candidates will be taken. If the determination of the 
nomination threshold is based on the previous year's legislative elections it 
will credit the possibility of new parties or parties that were not previously 
included to be able to enter parliament. 
Second, the problem that will arise if a high threshold is applied by 
simultaneous elections is the possibility of a dominant coalition against parties 
whose presidential candidates win the presidential election. In the sense of the 
loss of opposition as a counterweight to the power, because if the elections are 
simultaneous, parties will automatically vote in coalition with the winning 
party. Third, this concept will have the effect of dividing the supporters who 
are divided into only two camps. This is because with the high threshold 
mutatis mutandis will create only 2 presidential candidates in the election 
contestation (Budiardjo, 2003). Furthermore, the intensity or pressure on 
supporting fanaticism is not broken down and is focused on just two 
presidential candidates. Thus, in turn, it will decrease; the important role of 
law as a tool to translate the political situation and interests into good ideas 
for democratic development. 
There were several studies related to this research. Lytha Dayanara 
(2017)  wrote The Relevance of the System in the Simultaneous Election 
Implementation Model. The content of this thesis is merely to discuss the 
relevance of the system in Indonesia to hold simultaneous elections. While in 
this article, the writers discuss the politics of law or the interests that cause 
the emergence of rules regarding the presidential threshold in the holding of 
simultaneous elections. Mirza Nasution (2015) wrote Political Law in the 
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Indonesian Constitutional System. The writing discusses the political state of 
law, the legal system and the politics of legislation in Indonesia. While this 
article focuses more on the politics of law that arises in making rules related 
to the presidential threshold. In the journal written by Ayon Diniyanto (2018) 
under the title of Measuring the Impact of Implementing the Presidential 
Threshold in the 2019 Simultaneous Elections, can be found the discussion on 
the impact of implementing the presidential threshold which is held in 
simultaneous elections. It is explained that Indonesia is holding simultaneous 
elections for the first time. Hence the journal emphasizes the negative things 
that will occur if elections are held simultaneously. The difference is that the 
researchers in this article responds more to the impact caused by the abuse of 
legal politics in making rules related to the presidential threshold.  
RESEARCH METHOD 
Content analysis of legal drafts in the series of deliberations in the 
People Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) will be 
done. This discussion is the main reference in deciding legal products that may 
have certain characteristics. Conceptually the process of debating a draft will 
determine characteristics of legal products. For this reason, the discussion will 
focus and conclude the underlying legal politics of the presidential threshold. 
The using of Political Interests Theory is inevitable in this research. 
Political interests are interests created by humans in regulating relationships 
between one another (Budiardjo, 2007). In the interaction between one 
another, political interests are contained in a political system. Interest in any 
system can be described as input and output. The input itself represents the 
demands and aspirations of the community as well as support from the 
community, these inputs are then processed into policies and regulations. 
Gabriel A. Almond emphasized that political interests have a strong 
relationship with the political process which begins with the inclusion of 
demands that are articulated and aggregated by political parties, so that these 
special interests become a more general policy proposal, and are subsequently 
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incorporated into the policy-making process that is carried out by the 
legislative and executive bodies (Yana, 2016). Thus, political interests are 
closely related to political infrastructure activities such as pressure groups and 
political parties as well as the political superstructure such as the executive 
and legislative branches. According to Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, the study 
of the political process focuses on the activities of parties and interest groups, 
internal organizations, the nature of political decision-making, and the roles 
and backgrounds of politicians (Oman, 2016). The Interest groups are 
represented by the political parties which involve in the debate of the Bill. 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Legal Politics in Forming Legal Products 
Political law is the process of policy formation that occurs within a state 
institution authorized to form policies and regulations, to achieve the expected 
and desired goals of the state. The formation process will later produces a 
product of policies and regulations aimed at public interest (Soedarto 1983). 
Sunaryati Hartono holds a view regarding legal politics and is outlined in her 
book entitled Political Law Towards a National Legal System. In the book, legal 
politics is seen as a tool or a way to realize the ideals of the nation which are 
conveyed and outlined in the formation of national law through the 
government (Hartono, 1991). Abdul Hakim G Nusantara focuses legal politics 
into national legal politics. According to him, national legal politics is the effort 
of the government of a country that wants to implement nationally a legal 
policy (Thohari and Syaukani, 2006). 
National legal politics has several characteristics including consistency 
in the implementation of existing law, revitalization of laws that aim to replace 
laws that are considered obsolete with laws that adjust the times, reinforce the 
function of legal institutions as well as coaching members, and emphasize the 
views of policymakers into legal awareness in society (Thohari and Syaukani 
2006). 
Essentially, several important points or points form the basis of the 
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implementation of national legal political development. First, the foundation 
which is based on the norms of national and state life as well as the law with 
the spirit of Pancasila (ideal foundation). Second is the operational foundation, 
this foundation has several characteristics, i.e  (Rahardjo, 2006): 
1. A law that provides justice and prosperity, meaning that the law must be 
used as a tool or a means of renewal for the benefit of the people's welfare. 
Therefore, the formation of law must be harmonious and adapt to the 
concept of the welfare state, because the law is for humans. 
2. The creation of a strong democracy because of the law is formed here to 
strengthen democracy and must be based on a concept that emphasizes the 
sustainability of democracy and has the mindset of grounding democratic 
idealism in political life, therefore a legal foundation is needed that holds 
fast to democratic goals with the support of strong moral content. 
3. Laws that guarantee the basic rights of citizens. The point is that the law 
created must prioritize human rights. 
4. The law aims to guide the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. In the formation 
of law, the creation of an increasingly strong NKRI is the basic foundation 
that must be present in the drafting of legislation. 
5. Single diverse law; in the formation of law, one must pay attention to 
various kinds of differences, such as socio-cultural diversity and the many 
groups that exist, by sticking to the basis of the state and the priority of 
national unity. 
6. Laws were created to protect the nation and spill the blood of Indonesia. 
These foundations become the main axis in forming a legal product. The 
formation of legal products cannot be separated from nuances that are full of 
interests. In another view, the formation of law that has the interests of 
lawmakers can be dissected through political configurations. In Raison D'atre, 
the political configuration can be interpreted as the political will that exists 
and influences decisions on regulation-making. The formation of this 
regulation is in the realm of legislative institutions whose existence is 
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inseparable from various political wills. The concept of lawmaking is 
procedurally formed based on the political interests of various factions in the 
People Representative Institution (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) that affect 
the characteristics of legal products. (Marpaung, 2012). Factually, each legal 
norm is a transformation of a particular political configuration, so that its 
characteristics will affect the quality of a legal product (MD, 1993). For this 
reason, the making of regulations must be aimed at the ideal law and by the 
mandate of the constitution. 
The political configuration exists as a representative of a structure, 
political views and political system whose existence is evidence that the 
country adheres to a political-democratic or authoritarian system (MD, 2006). 
A country that adheres to a democratic political system can be seen from the 
application of the rule of law, freedom of opinion, and people's participation. 
This will have logical consequences that the law will be responsive (Mayo, 
1960). Whereas a state that has an authoritarian political system will have an 
impact on political structures that are fascist-conservative, meaning that 
political attitudes that are always taken are top to down so that it will limit 
people's freedom of opinion or in the sense of a political structure built to be 
conservative and orthodox  (Dahrendorf, 1986). Both schemes are not 
absolute because democratic political systems can produce orthodox legal 
character both formally and materially (Anggoro, 2019). 
To achieve the true essence of the law and achieve the welfare of the 
people, the formulation of rules through legislation systems is mandatory 
(Courtney and Smith 2010). For this reason, the practice of governing the 
government must create the quality of national law in achieving legal 
objectives, namely certainty, justice, and expediency. These goals are the 
responsibility of members of the DPR, DPD, DPRD, and the Government. 
Issues of Election and the Determination of Presidential Threshold 
The debate is the first round of a political process that revolves on every 
crucial issue, in which decisions on these crucial issues become an important 
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element for the continuation of political parties in the next election. The tug of 
war on several crucial issues that will receive special attention is evidence that 
the strong competition for power between factions since the beginning of the 
discussion at the special committee level. Initially, in the 4th Special Committee 
Meeting on February 13, 2017, the crucial issue was based on the Inventory 
List compiled by the Parliament as well as from the government which was 
agreed in 16 points. Then, this crucial issue increased to 18 crucial issues when 
the Special Committee member of the Golkar faction expressed their views on 
the urgency of the gender issue in this discussion. The addition of this crucial 
issue occurred at the 4th Working Meeting on February 13, 2017. Finally, after 
lobbying between factions, it was agreed to classify important issues at the 5th 
working meeting, on February 16, 2017, from 18 important issues to 5 issues 
to facilitate discussion and sharpen the comments. 
Related to 5 crucial issues (Kami 2017) The first is a discussion of the 
legislative election system. in this case, the government takes a stand by 
proposing a limited open proportional system through Article 138 paragraphs 
2 and 3 of the Election Bill. An open proportional representation system is a 
consideration to encourage candidates to compete in mobilizing mass support 
for their victory (Halim 2015). This can be categorized as a breakthrough, in 
which this system has never been practiced during the General Elections in 
Indonesia. Second, related to parliamentary threshold. According to the 
government in the Special Committee meeting, one of the objectives of the 
application of this rule is to create a simple multiparty system. The debate that 
arises related to the logic of government is not the number of political parties 
participating in the General Election which must be limited but rather the ideal 
number of political party forces, which needs to be empowered and 
streamlined in the DPR. 
Third, presidential threshold, this issue is about the threshold for 
political parties that want to carry a presidential candidate. Fourth, regarding 
the electoral districts (electoral districts). Related to the discussion of this 
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issue, there is one important point that arises, namely regarding the 
structuring of electoral districts that occur in the 2019. Election is the 
magnitude of electoral district or district magnitude (Zuhri 2018). 
Fifth the conversion of votes into seats. The debate related to the 
conversion of votes includes two general system choices that apply in the 
world namely; (a). hare quota; the method of converting votes into chairs using 
the formula, the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seat 
allocations that must be filled. To convert votes into chairs through this 
method, some stages must be carried out. (b) Saint lague: it means that every 
political party participating in the election must meet the specified vote 
threshold, parties that do not meet the threshold will not be included in 
determining seats in the People Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat/DPR) (Zuhri, 2018). From these 5 points, it becomes a conclusion that 
the implementation of the General Election was carried out simultaneously. 
These points become the main reasons for determining the final 
discussion of the Election Bill. The discussion took place at the Special 
Committee meeting of the Election Draft Bill with the agenda of deciding on 
the special committee recommendations that later the results of the decision 
would be brought to the plenary meeting for endorsement. However, the DPR 
Special Election Bill Committee had a meeting on Thursday night July 13, 2017. 
But again failed to decide on the 5 crucial issues.  
After entering the final phase of the discussion on the Election Bill, 
crucial issues that became a long debate in the Special Committee meeting on 
the holding of the General Elections, in turn, were now able to map the political 
support of the factions in the DPR into five issue packages. The five crucial 
issues became the focus of the Election Bill because the discussion did not 
reach an agreement at the special committee level. The five crucial issues 
offered by the special committee in 5 packages that can be selected by political 
parties in the DPR include see table 1: 
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Table 1. Package of issues in plenary meeting 
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Pure Saint Lague 
Voice conversion 
method: quota hare 
Source: Minutes of Special Committee Meeting on Election Implementation Bill (data after 
processing) 
 
Reading from the Table 1 from the debates that took place at the Special 
Committee meeting, 5 factions chose Package A, namely the PDIP faction, the 
Golkar faction, the PPP faction, the Nasdem party faction, and the Hanura party 
faction. While the other 5 factions, namely the Gerindra party, the Democrat 
party, the PAN faction, the PKB faction, and the PKS faction, have not yet 
decided on one of the 5 packages offered by the Election Bill Special 
Committee. Finally, the Special Committee agreed on the decision on the 5 
packages of issues of the Election system to be brought to the DPR's plenary 
session. By looking at the political map of the votes of these factions, the 
winner will likely be Package A, with the following counts table 2: 
Table 2. Map of Political Support Plenary Meeting of Election Draft (Before Lobbying) 
NO SUPPORT PACKAGE A SEAT REFUSE PACKAGE A SEAT 
1 PDI Perjuangan 109 Gerindra Party 73 
2 Golkar Party 91 Demokrat party 61 
3 PPP 39 PAN 48 
4 Nasdem Party 36 PKB 47 
5 Hanura Party 16 PKS 40 
  TOTAL 291 TOTAL 269 
Source: Minutes of Special Committee Meeting on Election Implementation Bill (data after 
processing) 
From the data that has been presented in the Table 2, with the 
acquisition of 291 votes in the voter group A package supporters of the 
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presidential threshold option 20% of the number of seats in the DPR or 25% 
of the acquisition of valid votes have won the battle and have concluded that 
package A is the choice that will be applied to concurrent elections. This 
indicates that the mechanism used in the simultaneous election is not much 
different from the mechanism applied in the implementation of the 2009 and 
2014 elections. 
The difference related to the determination mechanism is only in the 
parliamentary threshold which has a weighting of 3.5%, while the weight in 
package A has increased to 4%, and another difference that arises is the reuse 
of the pure Sainte Lague conversion method, it is the same as the mechanism 
used in The 2009 Election, while in the 2014 Election using the quota hare vote 
conversion method, the calculation method is using the formula V (vote / total 
valid votes) divided by S (seat/number of seat allocations), then the number 
of votes for a political party in an electoral area divided by the results of the 
calculation of the price of one seat, if there are still seats that have not been 
divided, another stage is carried out by distributing seats that have not been 
divided to parties that have the remaining majority of votes in sequence. 
The option of determining the presidential threshold 20% of the 
number of seats in the DPR or 25% of the acquisition of valid votes is also 
offered in the Package E option, but in the package E option there is a 
difference that lies in the parliamentary threshold whose determination rises 
to 4% in Package A and remains 3.5% in Package E. The next difference is in 
the pure saint lague system in Package A while in package E that is used for 
voice conversion is the quota hare system. Previously the PDIP faction with the 
most votes in parliament preferred the adoption of the voice conversion 
method using the quota hare method and tended to choose Package E, but the 
strong choice of the Golkar faction on the pure saint lague voice conversion 
method, made the PDIP fraction through government mediation, softened to 
merge to choose Package A. 
Package A, which was originally proclaimed and offered as an option by 
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the government, has a lot of support from factions in parliament almost certain 
to win. Although it has not yet become an official decision, the Minister of 
Home Affairs welcomed the increased support for package A which received 
new political support from the PPP faction and the Hanura party faction, where 
initially package A was only supported by the PDIP faction, the Golkar faction, 
and the Nasdem party faction. This concludes that among the 560 seats in the 
DPR, 291 seats or more than fifty percent outside the support of the 
government chose the mechanism to regulate Law No. 7 of 2017 concerning 
elections using package A. 
At the same time, there were still factions that had not yet pursued a 
single political choice, namely the Democrat party faction which was still 
adamant with the rejection of the options contained in package A, while the 
Gerindra faction, PKB faction, PKS faction, and PAN faction were still divided 
between Package C choices and Package D. If all of these factions join in only 
one decision, the votes still cannot beat the votes obtained by supporters of 
package A. Especially if the PKB faction crosses over and participates in 
choosing Package A, which in the history of the PKB faction's habits has always 
been supporting the government in policymaking. 
The long marathon process of political debate and communication has 
still not found common ground and has not provided clear results related to 
the use of mechanisms applied about Law No. 7 of 2017 on Elections. 
According to the mechanism in effect, the session was later suspended for 
lobbying. Political concessions made through the lobby remained unsuccessful 
so that after the plenary session reopened, decisions regarding package 
choices were not obtained. However, along with the lengthy pause of the 
meeting, it succeeded in changing the political map marked by the inclusion of 
PKB faction votes through intensive lobbying. They participated in choosing 
package A. The PKB faction joined the support of package A, then the 
calculation is as follow table 3: 
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Table 3. Map of Political Support in the Plenary Meeting 
NO SUPPORT PACKAGE A SEAT REFUSE PACKAGE A SEAT 
1 PDI Perjuangan 109 Gerindra Party 73 
2 Golkar Party 91 Demokrat party 61 
3 PPP 39 PAN 48 
4 NASDEM 36 PKS 40 
5 Hanura Party 16     
6 PKB 47     
  TOTAL 338 TOTAL 222 
Source: Minutes of Special Committee Meeting on Election Implementation Bill (data after 
processing) 
After a long process of voting finally, the victory was aimed at 
supporters of package A which was initially headed by the PDIP faction. 
Feeling to get political support from six factions in the DPR related to the 
number of factions that voted for package A, the PDIP faction suggested voting 
to be carried out because the meeting had taken a lot of time and had already 
made many decisions. This step of the PDIP faction can be said to be a form of 
political victory after successfully uniting the political support of the party 
supporting the government, while in discussions at the Special Committee 
level their political views often differ. 
While the attitude of the PAN faction that supports package B can be 
said to be not directly proportional to the other government supporting 
factions. Political attitudes that are different from other governments are also 
often shown by the PAN faction in several previous cases. For example in the 
case of the rejection of the Regulation of mass organizations issued by the 
government, in which the PAN faction was the only faction of the government 
coalition that rejected the central government regulations of mass 
organizations issued by the government. Such conditions are indeed common 
in the existence of political support in a presidential system, because political 
support is not permanent, but rather the calculation of interests. 
The discussion on the presidential threshold which was applied to the 
General Election was the discussion that drew the most attention of all factions 
in the DPR. Because until the deadline the DPR held a plenary session to agree 
on the Election Implementation Bill, discussions about the Presidential 
Threshold had failed several times to reach a decision. 
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The cause of the failure to reach the decision was the many tug-of-war 
interests, all factions still did not agree on the amount of the Presidential 
Threshold number that would later be used in the 2019 Presidential Election. 
If it is examined more fundamentally and deeper, the decision is not reached 
because each faction has different interests. 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 from the facts and data presented by the researcher 
in those tables, it may be related to the theory of political interest as stated 
above: political interest is behind the legal policy (Shidarta, 2012). Because 
basically in the making and ratification of the Election Bill, there is political 
intrigue that prioritizes the interests of the party elite rather than the interests 
of the community, the data that has been presented prove that there is a policy 
behind the legal policy in the discussion of the Election Implementation Bill, 
especially in discussions related to percentages. presidential threshold of 20%. 
This happens considering how important it is to fight for seats at the executive 
level. 
How important power is in the executive sphere in the implementation 
of the 2004 and 2009 Presidential Elections which were carried out after the 
Election for Members of Representative Institutions, according to the 
Constitutional Court it was found political facts that to get support for the 
election as President and the support of the DPR in the administration of 
government, if elected a Presidential candidate must have political 
negotiations and bargaining (bargaining) in advance with political parties 
which will greatly affect the running of the wheels of government in the future 
(Prasetyoningsih, 2014). In fact, these negotiations and bargains are tactical 
and momentary in nature rather than strategic and long-term, for example due 
to the long-term similarity of lines of struggle for political parties. Therefore, 
the President in fact becomes very dependent on political parties so that it can 
reduce the President's position in exercising government power according to 
the presidential government system. Thus the implementation of the 
Presidential Election must avoid the occurrence of political negotiations and 
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bargains that are tactical in nature for the sake of the moment, so as to create 
negotiations and strategic coalitions of political parties for the long term 
interests. 
Before the Bill on Elections was finalized in a plenary session with all 
members of the DPR, the bill was discussed beforehand at a meeting attended 
by a special committee. In the Special Committee meeting related to the 
Election, Bill was attended by each representative from each faction. Each 
faction was represented by several faction members with varying amounts of 
each faction, in addition to being attended by representatives of each faction 
that had been designated as members of the Special Committee, this meeting 
was also attended by several representatives from the government, namely 
the Minister of Home Affairs (MENDAGRI) along with their ranks, the Minister 
of Law and Human Rights (MENKUMHAM) and their ranks, the Minister of 
Finance (MENKEU) and their ranks. Apart from being attended by 
representatives from the government, this meeting was also attended by 
members of the Regional Representative Council. 
 
Figure 1. Special Committee on the discussion of the Election Draft Bill 
In this figure 1, it is clear that the Special Committee on the discussion 
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of the Election Draft Bill contains 30 representatives from each party faction 
in the DPR. In the Special Committee, the discussion of this bill was chaired by 
representatives of the PKB faction accompanied by several representatives 
namely from the Gerindra faction, the Democrat faction, and the PAN faction. 
In addition to the chairman and his representatives, the Special Committee 
also has members from the PDIP faction of 6 people namely; Arif Wibowo, HR 
Erwin Moeslimin Singajuru, SH, MH, Triemedya Panjaitan, SH, MH, Diah 
Pitaloka, S. Sos., Esti Wijayati, and Drs. Sirmadji, M.Pd., Golkar faction 5 people 
namely Rambe Kamarul Zaman, M.Sc., MM, Agung Widyantoro, SH, M.Sc., Dr. 
Ir. Hetifah Sjaifudin, MPP, H. Ahmad Zacky Siradj, and Agun Gunanjar Sudarsa, 
M.Sc., 3-person Gerindra faction Ir. Endro Hermano, MBA, H. Moh Nizar Zahro, 
S.H., Supratman, S.H., M.H., 2-person Demokrat faction Didik Mukrianto, S.H., 
Ir. Fandi Utomo, 2-person PAN faction  H. Totok Daryanto, S.E., Viva Yoga 
Mauladi, M.Si., 1-person PKB faction Neng Eem Marhamah Zulfa Hiz, S.Th.I., 2-
person PKS faction Drs. Al Muzzammil Yusuf, M.Si., Sutriyono, S.Pd.,M.Si., 2-
person PPP faction Dr. H. Mz. Amirul Tamim, M.Si., Ahmad Baidhowi, 1-person 
Nasdem faction Johnny G. Plate, S.E, 1-person Hanura faction Rufinus 
Hotmaulana Hutahuruk. 
With the many representatives of members from various factions in the 
Election Bill meeting, the determination related to the presidential threshold 
became a discussion that was colored by a lot of debate, it arose because of 
differences in interests of each faction. The interests of each faction in 
determining the presidential threshold can be classified into 3 groups, namely 
the threshold percentage of 20-30 percent, 0% or no threshold and the group 
taking the middle path is 10-15 percent. 
The first classification that requires a high threshold with a range of 20-
30 percent was conveyed by the Golkar party faction. In this case, the Golkar 
party faction wanted a presidential threshold percentage of 20-25 percent, this 
was also the same as the request of the PDI-P party faction who wanted the 
percentage reached 20-25 percent and the percentage was followed by several 
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factions such as the Hanura faction and the Nasdem party faction. Instead of 
following the four parties with a scale by the request from the government 
which is 20-25 percent, the PPP party faction wants a presidential threshold 
percentage with a higher amount of 30%, 
Furthermore, the second classification does not want a threshold or 0% 
presidential threshold. The faction that took a stand in this classification first 
was the Gerindra party faction. In this case, the Gerindra party faction 
established itself that if elections were held simultaneously then the threshold 
for presidential nomination or the presidential threshold would be irrelevant. 
In addition to the Gerindra party faction, the faction that does not want a 
threshold in the holding of simultaneous elections is the PKS faction. It is also 
guaranteed by representatives from the Democrat faction, these three factions 
are equally disapproving of a presidential threshold or 0% threshold if the 
election is held simultaneously. 
The third classification is the classification of faction groups that choose 
the magnitude of the presidential threshold is in the middle between the first 
classification with the second one. The factions in this group do not want a 
threshold amount that reaches 20-30 percent, because according to him the 
threshold is too large. This group does not want  also if the Presidential 
Election does not use a threshold amount, because it is feared the quality of 
the President obtained is inadequate. In this classification, there are 2 factions, 
namely the PAN fraction and the PKB faction. Both parties want a threshold 
amount in the Presidential Election in the range of 10-15 percent. For more 
details, the last position of each faction is listed in the following Figure 2: 
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Figure 2. Presidential Election 
Source: Minutes of Special Committee Meeting on Election Implementation Bill (data after 
processing) 
 
Law and Authoritarianism in the Presidential Threshold Regulation 
The discussion on the presidential threshold in a special committee 
meeting on the Election Implementation Bill has an element of interest from 
each faction. The determination of the presidential threshold is dominated by 
factions who want a high percentage of nomination limits. It was proven in the 
minutes of the meeting that 6 factions agreed with the government's proposal 
of 25% and some even reached the 30% limit. The remaining 3 factions want 
no limit in presidential nominations or 0% and one faction wants a 10% 
threshold. 
Contextually, the agreement can be seen in several debates that took 
place at the 6th Working Meeting on Friday, February 17, 2017. At the debate 
there was one important point that must be considered, from the 
representatives of the factions. The majority of the factions voiced the same 
votes related to the percentage of presidential threshold. The majority of the 
factions gave the same decision regarding this matter, namely approving 
Classification 1 Classification 2 Classification 2 
POLITICON : Jurnal Ilmu Politik Vol.3 No.1 ; Hal 133 - 160 
Website : http://journal.uinsgd.ac.id/index.php/politicon 
ISSN : 2685-6670 ( Online ) 
POLITICON VOL. 3 No.1 2021 
 
Copyright (c) 2021 JM Muslimin et.al 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-




proposals from the government. Golkar Party faction led by H. Rambe Kamarul 
Zaman, M. Sc., MM. Golkar faction expressed its attitude to agree with the 
government with a presentation size of 20-25%. In his view, Golkar considers 
that simultaneous elections are a direct order from the constitution, so that the 
terms and standards must be determined by the legislature (open legal policy). 
Furthermore, the PPP Faction (Dr. H. Mz. Amirul Tamim, M.Sc) in his 
political view provided two conceptually options, namely the presidential 
threshold with a percentage of 0% and 25-30%. This is because if you want 
each party to nominate their respective candidates, they must be based on 
normative provisions for each party entitled to nominate a presidential 
candidate. On one hand, if the presidential threshold percentage is set at 25-
30%, the concept is normative that every party that has a seat in the DPR has 
the right to nominate a presidential candidate. This means that to use the 
presidential threshold, parties must meet the national primary threshold 
provisions. 
The next view was conveyed by F-PKB (Dra. Hj. SITI MASRIFAH, MA) 
which was grammatically interpreted that the FKB faction considered that if 
the presidential threshold provisions were too high and had an impact on the 
inability of new parties to participate in the presidential election constellation, 
then it could not blame the verdict, Constitutional Court. 
 "If so, if it is possible to fight that this is not considered not to 
violate the results of the Constitutional Court's Decree, the PKB 
believes that agreeing with the government's proposal, at least the 
threshold follows the parliamentary threshold, then, yes (‘Risalah 
Rapat Pansus RUU Penyelenggaraan Pemilu, 2017)." 
For the attitude expressed by the Nasdem Party Faction (Drs. T. 
Taufiqulhadi, M.Sc.), giving an agreed view with the government, which is 25% 
without giving a logical argument or argument that can be justified. "If Nasdem 
agrees with the government, then we think that at least twenty percent of the 
total number of seats in the DPR or get twenty-five percent of the national 
legitimate votes. Like the government that is the attitude of Nasdem (‘Risalah 
Rapat Pansus RUU Penyelenggaraan Pemilu, 2017). The same attitude without 
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argumentation was also carried out by F-PDIP (Arif Wibowo) and F-Hanura 
(Rufinus Hotmaulana Hutahuruk) to directly agree with the provisions set by 
the government, which is 25%. 
Based on the attitudes and arguments of the factions, the overall 
agreement was agreed upon by the government. Agreements by some of the 
actors forming these regulations conceptually can be categorized as political 
forming of regulations. Before there were written rules, there was a political 
intention to achieve a goal. More clearly about the agreement before the 
formation of rules can be seen in the opinion of Spencer A. Overton regarding 
political law, namely: 
"Some problems involve the structure of institutions that regulate 
political activities such as allocating responsibility among federal, 
state, and local officials and between different branches and 
agencies within each level of government; varying standards (or a 
lack of standards) stemming from decentralization (for example, 
different localities resolving similar disputes or multiple federal 
agencies investigating the same set of allegations); delegating 
discretion to private actors such as political parties (for example, 
by allowing them to challenge voters at the polls); capture agency; 
and review of agency decisions. Other challenges stem from 
rulemaking and adjudication, such as the adequacy of notice and 
process, the clarity and administration of legal directives, and the 
balance between consistency and flexibility in decision making " 
(Overton, 2013). 
In his view, Overton stated universally that there are factors that 
determine a legal policy. This factor can be seen from the cultural conditions 
of a region or the will of political parties that have their respective interests. 
These factors will form regulatory standards that vary according to the 
interests behind the formation of the policy (Overton, 2013). 
Furthermore, according to Michael Bayles, political and legal relations 
can be simplified into 3 factors, (Bayles, 1982): 
1. A legal order can be empirically dependent upon a political order, a view 
held by all people who believe effectiveness is a necessary condition for the 
existence of a legal system 
2. A legal order can be normatively dependent upon a political order or a 
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political order that meets certain moral conditions such as consent or an 
internal morality.  
3. Either an empirical or normative relationship can be the basis for an 
analytic relationship so that the concept of a legal system logically depends 
on an effective or moral political order. 
The first factor empirically allows for the relationship between law and 
politics through political orders (political orders) (Bayles, 1982). These 
political orders are carried out by individuals or groups who assume that 
effectiveness is necessary for the existence of the legal system. The second 
factor assumes that legal orders are normatively dependent on political 
orders, meaning that formally the rules that are formed are following the 
morals desired by the political orders of legislators. The third factor, both the 
effectiveness and morale can be the basis for determining policy formation 
(Thompson, 2000). 
In discussing the determination of the presidential threshold at the 
limited meeting in 2017, it is clear that the dominance of parties that want a 
percentage of 20% has a relation in terms of strengthening the position of one 
of the presidential candidates, both effectively and morally (Thompson, 2000). 
The agreement to determine the presidential threshold by the 6 factions is 
systematically the same goal, namely to create overpower candidates in the 
presidential election (Mainwaring et al., 1997). There is almost no substantial 
debate on the determination of the presidential threshold. This is because in 
general the dominant factions choosing a high percentage want to strengthen 
presidential system and a small political party cannot necessarily be able to 
carry a pair of presidential candidates. According to the factions that agreed 
20%, the presidential threshold wanted high filtering (high standard) (Fogg, 
2002) in elections, even though these standards have political interests for 
incumbent candidates. 
This is in Bruce Cain's opinion "A narrow focus on election law prompts 
us to overlook non-selection governance issues, such as pay-to-play rules, 
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government transparency, lobbying regulation, and legislative ethics 
committees" (Cain, 2012). This means that in matters of election policy the 
riskiest thing to happen is the existence of supply and demand between the 
authorities and the stakeholders. 
If we look at the objectives of election based on the process and its 
results, according to Perhimpunan Pemilu dan Demokrasi (PERLUDEM), the 
objectives of the election are (i) making it easier for voters to vote, (ii) 
simplifying the implementation schedule, (iii) saving state funds, and (iv) 
balancing the burden of the organizer. Whereas in terms of results, the 
objectives of the election are (i) increasing voter participation and control of 
elected candidates, (ii) creating an effective presidential government system, 
(iii) simplifying the party system in the DPR and DPRD, and (iv) strengthening 
and democratizing political parties. These objectives must be written down in 
an explanation of the law, so that they are read as electoral designs that will 
facilitate the formulation of articles and paragraphs (Perludem, 2020). 
While normatively, the objectives of the election regulation can be seen 
in article 4 of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections, namely: 
The Election Arrangement aims to: 
a. strengthen the democratic state system; 
b. realize fair and integrity elections; 
c. ensure consistency in the regulation of the electoral system; 
d. provide legal certainty and prevent duplication in directing   elections, and 
e. realize effective and efficient elections. 
Based on the above points of objectives of the election, in determining 
the presidential threshold, it seems do not describe the essence of the 
objectives of the election regulations. This causes intrigue and problems in a 
structured and massive way: starting from the initial stage of the 
disproportionate candidacy, because the simultaneous election model that 
uses a split ticket cannot provide a leader candidate who should be able to 
appear more. In terms of effectiveness, it was not created because after the 
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election, the political situation was destructive and political monopoly became 
very high. 
Furthermore, at the level of the presidential government system, what 
is desired is a balance between parliament and the executive. Whereas 
essentially a presidential system in Indonesia requires a balanced and 
controlled government (checks and balances)  (Aritonang, 2010). Factually, 
the application of the presidential threshold creates an unbalance government 
because the executive position is more dominant in running the government. 
The condition in the parliament which should be the people's watch tool has 
become one direction with the president's policy and even seems not to look 
at the people as their constituents (Soetjipto, 2014). This is also caused by 
simultaneous elections which provide very short pauses to form coalitions in 
government. So that the parties will automatically join the bearer party that 
has a high parliamentary threshold and incumbent candidates who have above 
average electability. 
Based on this answer a pattern of legal political relations that emerged 
in the formation of the presidential threshold percentage applied to the 
holding of simultaneous elections. The high percentage of presidential 
threshold becomes a benchmark that the rules have original intensities which 
are contrary to responsive legal rules, which is rooted in four basic steps such 
as ideological footing, normative footing, constitutional footing and moral 
footing (Tanya, 2011). Instead, it is more inclined to the political intrigue that 
prioritizes the interests of the government elite rather than the interests of 
society which should be the main value in the formation of responsive laws. 
Based on the perspective of legal politics, the non-fulfillment of the values 
contained in the formation of responsive law shows that the formation of the 
law is conservative or orthodox, it is related to other variables, namely the 
authoritarian political system. 
CONCLUSION 
The presidential threshold legal politics have the characteristics of 
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authoritarian law. This is because in the discussions at the Special Committee 
on the Election Implementation Draft Bill related to the formation of the 
presidential threshold tend to be led by the domination of incumbent 
government, instead of to strengthen democracy or strengthen the 
presidential system. In the discussion of the special committee meeting, there 
were also political interests of the authorities to maintain the power of the 
ruling party and incumbent government. The political politics of determining 
the presidential threshold also contradicts the principle of effective and 
proportional election objectives, because the presence of a presidential 
threshold with a high percentage of up to 20% creates a gap in political rights 
or democratic rights between parties with majority votes and minority parties. 
The authoritarian legal characteristics of the presidential threshold 
discussion have hurt the electoral system and democracy in Indonesia. This 
can be described based on several things: first, the number of digits of 
presidential threshold which has been determined before the holding of the 
Special Committee on Election Implementation Bill on the presidential 
threshold. Secondly, the magnitude of the presidential threshold percentage up 
to 20% results is in high political intensity. This arises as a result of the small 
number of candidates who can participate in the Presidential Election 
contestation. Third, there is an inconsistency of political willingness in the 
Special Committee on Election Implementation Bill related to the 
determination of the presidential percentage threshold. 
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